:: Seventh Circuit Permits Provider To Assert State Law Claims Over ERISA Preemption Challenge

August 4, 2008 · Posted in Uncategorized 

Of course the difficulty arises in drawing the line between what is completely preempted and what escapes the cast of the federal net. The Supreme Court in Davila used a two-part analysis for determining when a claim has been completely preempted by ERISA . . .

Franciscan Skemp Health care v. Central States, No. 07-3456 (7th Cir.) (July 31, 2008)

In this recent provider reimbursement case, the Seventh Circuit has given ERISA preemption a narrow footprint which signals the continuance of a trend favoring state law remedies for providers based upon the Davila analysis. The case points up a stark contrast between provider claims and those of employees where promised benefits are disappointed.

In Skemp, the provider evidently sought to precertify coverage before providing treatment to Sherry Romine. Apparently satisfied with the response from the plan, the health care facility provided coverage. Romine did not pay the COBRA premiums, however, and her coverage was terminated under the plan.

Thus, it appears that Romine had coverage when the provider posed the inquiry to the plan, but lost it retroactively when the COBRA premium was not paid.

Despite having obtained an assignment of benefits from Romine Sherry and submitting a claim form, the provider, in the view of the Seventh Circuit, was not precluded by ERISA preemption from asserting state law claims when the benefits were denied by the plan.

The rationale:

Franciscan Skemp is bringing these claims of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel, not as Romine’s assignee, but entirely in its own right. These claims arise not from the plan or its terms, but from the alleged oral representations made by Central States to Franciscan Skemp. Franciscan Skemp could bring ERISA claims in Romine’s shoes as a beneficiary for the denial of benefits under the plan; but it has not. In fact, Franciscan Skemp does not at all dispute Central States’s decision to deny Romine coverage. Franciscan Skemp acknowledges that Romine is not entitled to benefits, because she failed to make her COBRA premium payments.

The allowance of state law claims in this context provides an interesting contract to the results in another Seventh Circuit case, this time involving an employee. See, McDonald v. Household Intern., Inc. , 425 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 2005).

Compare these facts with those in Franciscan Skemp:

James McDonald began working for HSBC Financial Corporation (“HSBC”) on November 19, 2001. He received a letter stating that “[y]our health and life insurance will be effective 30 days from your start date.”

McDonald had a prescription for a blood pressure medication which he had been taking before coming to work for HSBC. After the 30-day waiting period, he repeatedly tried to get the prescription filled, but each time, he was told that “his paperwork had not come through”.

Despite several subsequent appeals to his employer and Defendant United Healthcare Corporation (“United”), the insurer under the HSBC health benefits plan, McDonald’s benefits were not approved and, on January 15, 2002, he suffered a catastrophic hypertensive stroke. McDonald filed suit, asserting “six counts against HSBC and United, including breach of contract, negligence, loss of consortium and other state law theories of recovery.”

In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that McDonald’s claims were preempted – even though he had never been covered under the plan. In Franciscan Skemp, the provider took an assignment, advanced claims initially on a claim form, and the assignor did, in fact, have coverage (retroactively terminated, of course, based on COBRA rules.)

(More on the subsequent attempt to salvage an ERISA claim in McDonald can be read here -:: Make-Whole Claim Against Fiduciary Survives Motion To Dismiss)

Note: One of the first incursions into ERISA preemption in provider reimbursement cases developed along the lines of independent legal duties (the Davila analysis) based upon managed care contracts. See, e.g., the Third Circuit rational discussed in :: Managed Care Contract Gives Rise to “Independent Legal Duty” Which Survives ERISA Preemption and :: Third Circuit Remands Health Care Provider’s Reimbursement Litigation To State Court

See also - The Ninth Circuit approach to the issue is reviewed in:: Ninth Circuit Reaffirms Holding That Health Care Provider’s Non-Derivative State Law Claims Are Not ERISA Preempted. And see, :: Hospital State Law Claims Against Aetna HMO & PPO Plans Remanded To State Court; and see a different take on this issue in :: Worthless Payment Commitments – The ERISA Preemption Escape
Thanks to Rob Hoskins for calling attention to this case on erisaboard.com

Comments

2 Responses to “:: Seventh Circuit Permits Provider To Assert State Law Claims Over ERISA Preemption Challenge”

  1. John Eggertsen on August 5th, 2008 5:04 pm

    Roy

    We’ve already discussed the question of 502 vs. 514 preemption (Devilla being the former) and the difficulty of identifying an “independent legal duty” (e.g., wouldn’t a state statute creating coverage by estoppel under these facts be preempted, at least under 514 as “relating to” an ERISA plan?) so my current issue is–if the 7th is right, won’t all PPOs, TPAs and insurers either stop doing pre-certs or have stronger caveats? In either case, will providers start turning patients away, particularly hospitals who usually have a duty to provide services, at least for 24 hours?

    Going back to the “relate to” question, isn’t the “independent legal duty” derived from detrimental reliance which means the doctor or hospital had to reasonably believe there was coverage under an ERISA plan, otherwise they would have turned the patient away. How can that be “independent”?

    Finally, I can’t resist reasserting that the providers PPO contract probably has a provision regarding pre-certs and that that document is relly an ERISA Plan document, another “relation to” fact.

    Your thoughts welcomed.

  2. Roy F Harmon III on August 6th, 2008 8:14 am

    John, Davila has really changed things up for providers as you have observed in our prior discussions. When a federal court reaches the point that a state common law claim will suffice as an “independent legal duty”, what is really left of complete (viz, jurisdictional) preemption? The step toward allowing state law claims based upon managed care contracts where the provider had not accepted an assignment gives one pause – but the further step of allowing a provider that as taken an assignment (and filed claims, mind you, after seeking coverage verification!) to re-tool its complaint as a state common law claim – well, that seems to give providers an election that I don’t think ERISA has traditionally allowed. Furthermore, the federal courts do not give individual claimants the same option – witness the McDonald case, also from the 7th, noted in my post. What is the material difference between the two plaintiff’s cases? At one point, the provider actually had assignee status and during the COBRA election period, had the right to pursue a claim – the employee never got that far in that he never received the promised coverage. However you come out on the normative rule, the application should be consistent. It’s not.

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