:: Seventh Circuit Holds Disability Benefits Claim Incompatible With ADA Claims

October 28, 2009 · Posted in 502(A)(1)(B) CLAIM FOR BENEFITS 

Claiming disability benefits and asserting ADA claims are not always mutually exclusive, but a “plaintiff’s sworn assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for example, ‘unable to work’ will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case–at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999).

 To be sufficient, an explanation must “warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that, assuming the  truth of, or the plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job, with, or without ‘reasonable accommodation.’” Id. at 807. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Butler, as we must, he has provided no satisfactory explanation for his inconsistency.

Butler v. Round Lake Police Dep’t, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23602 (7th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009)

In Butler v. Round Lake,  the Seventh Circuit addresses the tension between claiming disability benefits and asserting a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act.  Invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Court holds that the disability claim barred the ADA claim.  The opinion highlights the minefield through which counsel must navigate to hold onto claims which, on many facts, will simply be mutually exclusive – as was the case here.

The Court notes that:

To succeed on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must show that, “with or without reasonable accommodation,” he can “perform the essential functions” of his job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

Disability Claim

Since the plaintiff, as police officer, had testified to his disability due to COPD in seeking a disability pension, he created a record inimical to a key element of  his ADA claim – i.e.,  that he could perform the essential functions of his job.

To adjudicate his request, the Round Lake Police Pension Board held a hearing where Butler testified that his duties as sergeant included “patrol,” which involved all the typical activities of a police officer. He said his pulmonary condition made it impossible to do the required duties, such as chasing a suspect or wrestling with an unruly one. Butler supported his application with certificates of disability from three physicians, including Dr. Allegretti, who noted that Butler is “permanently disabled from police service, but may perform duties on a restricted physical basis as follows: No rotating shifts, no strenuous activity, no wrestling, no fighting, no running, no constant walking greater than 4 blocks, no carrying more then [sic] 20 lbs. May do sit down job.” After Butler presented his testimony and disability certificates, the pension board found that he qualified as disabled and awarded him benefits.

ADA Claim

 While continuing to collect his pension,  the plaintiff filed an ADA claim.   It appears that he felt there were some light duty assignments that he could perform – although due to the small size of the policy force, “light duty” assignments were ostensibly unavailable.

In any event, the Court took the disability statements as incompatible with the ADA claim:

  But accepting Butler’s sworn testimony before the pension board as true, we cannot see how he could perform essential police functions–with or without accommodations. We agree with the district court that under the principle of judicial estoppel, Butler’s claim must fail.

Judicial Estoppel

There are a number of formulations of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  Here was the Court’s formulation.

Judicial estoppel provides that a party who prevails on one ground in a prior proceeding cannot turn around and deny that ground in a subsequent one. Ogden Martin Sys. of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Whiting Corp., 179 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 1999). It is an equitable concept designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process and “to prevent litigants from ‘playing fast and loose with the courts.’” In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953)). Its purpose is to prevent a litigant from prevailing “twice on opposite theories.” Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1992). In order to secure disability benefits, Butler said he was unable to  perform basic police duties. Now, in order to claim damages, he says he is, or at least was, able to perform those duties. This is just the kind of about-face judicial estoppel seeks to prevent.

The Court affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Note:   Many formulations of the judicial estoppel doctrine are more detailed than that set forth in this opinion.   In any event, the prior statements were an admission that was fatal to the plaintiff’s case.

Reconciling ADA Claims -  There may be a middle way if the facts warrant.  The Court observed:

Claiming disability benefits and asserting ADA claims are not always mutually exclusive, but a “plaintiff’s sworn assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for example, ‘unable to work’ will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case–at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999). To be sufficient, an explanation must “warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job, with, or without ‘reasonable accommodation.’” Id. at 807. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Butler, as we must, he has provided no satisfactory explanation for his inconsistency.

Cleveland and much of its progeny deal with Social Security Disability claims, whereas this case involves Illinois police pension benefits. However, the principles are pretty much the same. If anything, the estoppel principle applies more readily here because the pension board procedure governed by the Illinois Pension Code has nothing “equivalent to the Social Security listings that extend benefits automatically to people with specified conditions, whether or not they can work.” Opsteen v. Keller Structures, Inc., 408 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2005) (contradictions between applications for ERISA benefits and ADA claims are no more acceptable than those between SSDI applications and ADA claims). Instead of automatic grants, the Round Lake Police Pension Board makes an individualized inquiry to determine whether the officer is disabled.

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