:: ERISA “Participant” Status Is Not A Jurisdictional Issue
Whether Leeson is a participant for purposes of ERISA is a substantive element of his claim, not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006).
To the extent our prior cases—including Curtis—hold otherwise, they have “no precedential effect” because they are precisely the type [*4] of “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” the Supreme Court has since rejected. Id. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)). We therefore vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1248 (9th Cir. Wash. Jan. 23, 2012)
Whether a plaintiff is a “participant” has posed one of the great metaphysical questions in ERISA benefits litigation. It is usually clear that the person was once a participant – but following separation from employment, are they still? The question can present itself in the form of another ERISA imponderable – that of standing (see, e.g., :: The Continuing Controversy Over Standing To Sue Under ERISA).
In this recent Ninth Circuit opinion, the Court, taking its cue from the Supreme Court decision in Arbaugh, took a relatively mundane approach to the issue. Whether a plaintiff is a participant or not is not jurisdictional, but rather just another aspect of the proof of his or her case.
Granting that some of its prior jurisprudence conflicted with this ruling, the Ninth Circuit disavowed those prior cases, dismissively characterizing them as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings”. (The blame for introducing this bizarre metaphor apparently belongs to Justice Scalia. See, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1998)).
